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A Realistic Alternative to War
A Sermon Given
by The Reverent Roger Fritts
on April 25, 1999
at Cedar Lane Unitarian Universalist Church
Bethesda, Maryland
We Americans hold widely shared views about what is going on in Kosovo. Most of us agree that killing an estimated
thirty-five hundred ethnic Albanians and driving hundreds of thousands of them from their homes is wrong. Remembering the deaths of millions of innocent Jews in Europe, we take seriously the responsibility of the United States in
making sure such a genocide does not happen again. Now that we have begun to fight, our national reputation and the
reputation of the other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a stake.
In contrast, the people living in the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia also hold widely shared, but very different, views
about what is going on in Kosovo. By reading newspaper accounts, I have tried to understand the viewpoint of the
Serbs. Here is what I have discovered.
The Serbs consider Kosovo a fundamental part of their nation. For them Kosovo is the blood-soaked soil where their
ancestors forged Serbia's nationhood in 1389, when Turkish armies defeated Serbian forces on the Kosovo plain,
ushering in five centuries of Islamic domination. Generations of Serbian schoolchildren have memorized heroic poems
about the battle.
Also, Serbs have a deep spiritual feeling for Kosovo. In Kosovo are five historic monasteries, which because of the
close identification between Serbian nationalism and the Orthodox faith, are considered both politically and religiously
sacred. Serbs described Kosovo as the heart of Serbia. For many Serbs, Kosovo has the significance of a holy land
without which Serb identity is unthinkable. Many are ready to kill or to be killed for this land.
Just as the United States fought a civil war to prevent its southern states from seceding, the Serbs feel they have a right
to prevent Kosovo from seceding. They believe that under international law a sovereign state has the right to prevent
the secession of one of its integral provinces.
Many Serbs distrusted the NATO countries. Just a few years ago the Croatian Army drove tens of thousands of Serbs
from their ancestral homes, killing many in the process. The Serbs remember that NATO countries expressed little
anger or moral fury about that refugee crisis.
When Serb officials attended the February peace conference in France, they believe that NATO did not act as a neutral
negotiator. Instead NATO sided with the ethnic Albanians. NATO countries dictated their terms to the Serbs. No
negotiation took place.
The proposal to place armed NATO troops in Kosovo was unacceptable to the Serbs. Serbs had already agreed last
October to the introduction of more than a thousand unarmed foreign observers. But armed foreign troops was going
too far. They remember the Turkish occupation that ended in 1912 and the German occupation that ended in 1945. In
the same way we would oppose German or Japanese or Russian military troops occupying one of our states, they feel
that the introduction of armed NATO troops is unacceptable.
The proposal that in three years a decision should be made about the destiny of Kosovo, perhaps by offering a
referendum, was, from a Serb perspective, tantamount to giving Kosovo independence. The Serbs could tell what the
outcome of such a referendum, restricted to inhabitants of Kosovo, would be. From our point of view, it would be like
settling the American Civil War in 1860 by holding a referendum in each southern state, asking whether they would
like to stay in the Union or leave.
This ultimatum, worked out in February, was unacceptable to the vast majority of Yugoslavia's citizens. Serbs felt they
had no choice but to reject it. Furthermore, as the Kosovo Liberation Army continued to attack police and soldiers in
Kosovo, they felt that their only choice was to fight back. The deaths of civilians at the hands of the police and military
were regrettable. However, Serbs looked at these deaths the way most Americans look at the deaths of the Branch
Davidians in Waco, Texas. In the same way most Americans do not blame our FBI for the deaths in Waco, Serbs feel
that responsibility for the Albanian deaths is with the Kosovo Liberation Army.
If this is how the Serbs see the situation, will we change their minds with our bombs and missiles? The air war has
support among many leaders in NATO and in the United States. However, history and common sense suggest that it
will not be successful in achieving our goals.
In the short history of aerial bombing one nation has surrendered, just because of bombing, without an invasion using
ground troops. That nation was Japan. On the other hand, England did not surrender to Germany because of the
intensive bombing in 1940 and 1941. Germany did not surrender to the allies because of the intensive bombing. Ground
troops were necessary. North Vietnam did not surrender, although we dropped more conventional bombs on that country
than we dropped on Germany during the Second World War. Iraq has not surrendered to the United States in spite of
all the bombs and missiles used during the Gulf War and its aftermath. After eight years of sanctions and bombing we
are still waiting for the people of Iraq to get rid of Saddam Hussein.
In all these countries aerial bombing led to a greater unity among the people. This has also happened in Yugoslavia.
Serbs feel that the United States and its NATO allies have engaged in an illegal act of aggression against a sovereign
state. Serbs point out that NATO has bypassed the United Nations. They point out that they have not fired a single shot
at any NATO member.
The Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic is the elected leader of a coalition of three political parties, none of which
has a majority in parliament. Before the bombing he was unpopular with many Serbs. However, when the bombing
began, the ranks closed around the Serb President and opposition to his leadership completely disappeared. Being pro-Western is hard while the West is blowing up your bridges and buildings. Most tragically, the bombing eliminated any
reason Serb leaders had to show restraint in attacking the Kosovo Liberation Army or in forcing ethnic Albanians out of
Kosovo. We have all seen on television the tens of thousands of people who have been forced out of their homes by the
Serb army. NATO estimates the Serb forces have killed 3,500 ethnic Albanians.
In public, President Clinton and his advisors continue to say they are "confident" that the bombing campaign will
eventually result in Serbs withdrawing their troops from Kosovo. However, if history is correct, for an air war to
succeed we must be willing to do to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia what we did to Japan in 1945.
Such a devastating air war is morally unacceptable to both President Clinton and to the American people. Therefore,
eventually we must face up to the limitations of air attacks and look to other ways of bringing this war to an end.
One solution is ground troops. Clearly NATO can win with ground troops. However, more human lives will be lost. No
one knows how many, but American and European solders will die. Furthermore, a ground war will cost a great deal of
money.
Another solution would be to stop the bombing, devote our resources to helping the refugees, and reestablish
negotiations with the Serbs. By negotiations, I mean a real effort on our part to understand our interests better and to
understand the perceptions and legitimate interests of the Serbs.
What are the interests of the people of the United States? Our immediate goal is to prevent the destruction of the ethnic
Albanian people. Our long term goal is to establish international standards that will encourage the peaceful resolution of
ethnic and religious disputes.
What are the interests of the Serbian people? Their immediate goal is to retain political control of Kosovo. Their long
term goal is to prosper and to live in peace with their neighbors.
The President has his own interest in all of this. Like every President, Bill Clinton has the desire to go down in
American history as a good and effective leader. Having survived an embarrassing scandal, and having less than two
years left in his term, he hopes to go down in history as a President who played a positive and constructive role in
preventing genocide and establishing a better world order.
A realistic alternative to continuing this war is for us to understand our interests, the interests of the ethnic Albanians
and the interests of the Serbs, and then to find measures that will solve their problems in a way that will also solve
ours. We can advance our interests only by paying attention to those of the Serbs.
What power do we have, besides military power, that we can use to meet our needs and the needs of the Serbs and the
ethnic Albanians? We are apparently willing to spend a billion dollars a month on an air war to destroy Yugoslavia.
Instead we could offer to spend a billion dollars a month to rebuild the country we are now destroying. In exchange for
this we could require that the attacks on ethnic Albanians stop and that the refugees be allowed to return home and that
a force acceptable to both the Serbs and the Albanians police the agreement. The details would need to be worked out
in negotiation.
Of course, we could stop the bombing and offer to negotiate and have the Serbs refuse to negotiate. The Serbs could
refuse to stop their efforts to push ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. They could refuse to let the Albanian refugees
return.
If we stop bombing and the Serbs refuse to negotiate, what is our backup plan? We could resume the bombing. We
could plan an invasion. Or we could take the one billion dollars a month the bombing costs and use it to resettle the
ethnic Albanians in Albania or in other countries, including our own, if they wish to come here. In addition we could
offer scholarships and living expenses to any Serb soldier who was willing to desert the Serb army. In this way we
could undermine the authority and power of the current Serb leadership, without bombing or killing people.
This approach does not depend on Serb cooperation. We can do this even if the Serbs refuse to have anything to do
with us. If we choose this route, far fewer lives would be lost. It will cost far less to resettle the refugees than it will
cost to invade Kosovo.
Some, of course, will say that this is appeasement. Some will say that if we stop the bombing, we are appeasing the
Serbs in the same way Neville Chamberlain appeased the Nazis in 1938. The Serbs have compared NATO to the Nazis
and some NATO leaders have compared Milosevic to Hitler. The Serbs have vowed that they will not agree to have
their country occupied by foreign troops as it was by Germany in the 1940s. Some NATO leaders have vowed that they
will not allow Serbs to treat ethnic Albanians the way the Nazis treated the Jews.
The Second World War was the defining event of this century. Nevertheless, it is a mistake for us to re-fight World
War II in the last year of the twentieth century. I see many differences between Kosovo in 1999 and the Sudetenland in
1938. We can, however, apply one important lesson from World War II. We could have saved many Jews in Europe, if
we had opened our doors and allowed them into the United States. In the same way, if our goal today is to save human
lives, we can open our doors to the ethnic Albanians. If our goal is to save human lives, stopping the bombing and
caring for the refugees is the right answer.
Perhaps by looking at the events leading up to this war, we can learn how to avoid getting into this situation in the
future. For nine years, a strong non-violent movement existed in Kosovo. I believe we would never have reached the
point we are at today, if we had given more support to the Kosovo Democratic League. In 1989 the Serbian authorities
denied the Albanians education, medical attention, newspapers and political rights. In response, the Albanians built up
their own institutions, from schools to clinics to an unofficial parliament.
The head of this peaceful struggle, and the most popular figure in Kosovo, was I-bra-him Ru-go-va, a soft-spoken
intellectual whose trademark is a silk scarf wrapped around his neck. Born in 1945, Rugova studied literary criticism at
the Sorbonne. In 1990 he organized a region-wide referendum in which most Kosovans voted for a form of independence. In 1992 his party won an overwhelming victory in an election to choose a Kosovo Parliament. Each time
Albanians conducted the balloting in private homes. The Serbian authorities would not recognize the vote for
independence or the Parliament election. Nevertheless, in most communities the police allowed the balloting to proceed
freely.
A few Albanians violently attacked Serbs. However, Rugova and other Albanian leaders contended that anything
beyond non-violent resistance would be madness. They constantly warn against any deed that could serve as a pretext
for greater Serbian repression. In an interview in 1992 Rugova said "We have no army, of course, or post office, and
we exist on the charity of our people. But there is no doubt that we have moral and political power. De facto, we are in
power, and we must be invited as the legitimate representatives of Kosovo to any international conference on
Yugoslavia."
The invitations did not come. The Dayton accord was developed without any invitation to the ethnic Albanians to be
part of the process. Over time a few young men became impatient with the non-violent approach. They formed the
Kosovo Liberation Army, and began ambushing police and soldiers. The Serbs retaliated by attacking villages that they
believed were supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army. A brutal attack on a village a year ago caused thousands of
ethnic Albanians to finally abandon non-violence and join the Kosovo Liberation Army. As the violence increased, the
United States started to support the non-violent movement, pushing Milosevic to meet with Rugova for the first time.
But it was too late. The Kosovo Liberation Army had won too many converts and they continued their war against the
Serbian Army. In January 1999 the Serbian Army killed fifty people in a village they felt was helping the Kosovo
Liberation Army. This so angered diplomats in the United States that we gave the Serbs the ultimatum to which they
could not agree. A month ago the war began.
One realistic alternative to war would have been to strongly support the non-violent movement within Kosovo much
sooner then we did. Perhaps we can learn from this mistake.
Today there are three choices. NATO can send in ground troops. NATO can continue the bombing. Or NATO can stop
the bombing and trying to negotiate an end to the war.
I have heard the story of a man who worked for many years as an assistant coach of a very successful college
basketball team. When the head coach retired, the University President appointed the assistant coach as the new head
coach. A few weeks into the season a reporter asked the new head coach how things were going. The man said, "I
never realized until now what a difference there is between giving advice and making a decision."
Nevertheless, since the Jewish prophets began to speak three thousand years ago it has been the traditional role of
religious leaders to offer advice to political leaders. This morning my best advice for our President is that we stop the
bombing. My advice is that we help the refugees and that we try to negotiate a reasonable end to this war. In saying
this I realize that offering advice is much easier than making a decision.
In the past the road to greatness in the presidency was war. Our most celebrated presidents, Washington, Lincoln,
Roosevelt, are admired because of their leadership in war. But I believe now that we are the most wealthy and most
powerful nation in the world, the road to greatness for a President is not leadership in war. Today the road to greatness
is leadership that helps others resolve their differences peacefully. I pray that the President will take that path as he
works to establish his place in history.
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